A Third Way

Two nights ago, AJ Burnett got absolutely lit up by the Phillies, giving up 6 runs in 2 innings. This was on three days rest, so it was treated as a big shock by the NY media. Of course, about 25% of Burnett's starts are really bad and you never really know what you are going to get. After all, last year he did go 3-0 with a 1.86 ERA on 3-days rest pitching in Toronto. There has been a lot of second guessing as to what Girardi should've done with the pitching rotation and it has centered around two choices:

1) Start Chad Gaudin in Game 5, who hadn't started in over a month and then have AJ and Pettite on full rest start Games 6 and 7 with CC coming out of the pen
2) Stick with the 3-man rotation

But there was a third option, that was of course never considered publicly: treat Game 5 like a spring training game. Why not take advantage of NY's extremely deep bullpen? Have a lineup that looks like:

Two innings of Gaudin...and then completely blowing Charlie Manuel's mind by going:
2IP: Joba
2IP: Robertson
2IP: Hughes
1IP: Rivera
(with doses of Marte and Coke sprinkled in as needed)

I would prefer not to start Gaudin, but Aceves instead. I would just start Gaudin so the trap could be sprung. Gaudin had no place starting against the Phillies anyway; he is absolutely killed by left-handed batting who hit 100 points of OPS higher against him than RHB. The Phillies left-handers would have destroyed him. If he couldn't handle left-handers in the caverns of Petco he definitely couldn't handle them in the bandbox of Philly.

Each of these relievers would be dealing HEAT and it would be a glory to watch.

This couldn't have been any more ineffective than Burnett and the bullpen would be rested due to the off-day in time for Game 6 if it were needed. But it's unfortunate that managers are to risk averse and would rather fail in old-fashioned ways than running the risk of failing in an original way and being crucified for it.

An IPhone app would have done a better job than Girardi last night

I speak of course of this awesome app

Girardi made so many dumb decisions in game three it was mind boggling. He'd consort his magic binder, which I can only assume is the MLB equivalent of "Ask Madden", and then proceed to help the Angels win the game. The defensive replacement of Damon for Hairston makes little sense. Hairston posted an ultimate zone rating of 0.4 in 2009. Damon posted an -11.2 UZR. That isn't a huge defensive upgrade and certainly not one worth sacrificing the designated hitter for.

This decision led to another bad decision. Mariano was due up in the top of 10th with two outs. So Girardi pinch-hit for him. Why he would do this boggles my mind. There is almost no chance of scoring a run in this situation. The pinch-hitter promptly grounded out. Rather than letting Rivera hit (and maybe hitting a home run, who knows), he had to be taken out of the game after having only pitched an inning.

The Yankees bullpen were settling into a rhythm. David Robertson had recorded two quick and easy outs. But then Girardi looks into his files and decides to pull Robertson and go with Aceves for whatever reason. Aceves promptly comes in and gives up a single and a walk-off double. At least he could have let Robertson try and finish the inning. The bullpen was pretty much empty by that point.

At least Nick Swisher didn't lay down any bunts.

Managers Making Their Team's Worse

This off-season, Tony La Russa will enter into negotiations with the Cardinals regarding his future status with the club. He is also rumored to be considering retirement. This would be in the best interest of the Cardinals, financially and for the club's future success.

TLR has an amazing managerial pedigree. He is third on the all-time managerial wins list with 2,552. He's second in Major League games managed with 4,773. Of all the managers currently in the game, La Russa is certainly the most storied and accomplished manager. In 2007, La Russa signed a 2-year deal worth $8.5million through 2009. That's $4.25 million dollars that the team isn't spending on talent. There is no way he is providing the team with four million dollars worth of wins If the Cards didn't have TLR they could've gotten Bobby Abreu, who would provide a great deal of value to any offense last off-season. Instead, they were weighed down by the manager's contract.

It's not even like TLR is that good a manager. He often hurts the team. He hates to give rookies playing time, even if they're better than the veterans. He manages his bullpen in an extremely inefficient way, bringing in relievers to just face one batter before swapping them out even though it has been shown that the marginal gain is practically zero. He also trusts his closers and uses predefined roles for his relievers too much. Ryan Franklin should've been lifted after the Holliday error and they should've brought in Smoltz or any other reliever, who could have gotten one out without allowing four baserunners. Another mistake he made was not pinch hitting for Carpenter when they were down a run in Game 1, top of the 5th, two outs, and a runner at second. Carp of course struck out. When you're losing, you need offense, not your ace pitcher sticking around making sure that making sure you don't lose by too much.

Joe Torre also does really dumb stuff that costs teams wins, yet he still holds a three-year 13 million dollar contract. He batted his best batter 7th (Matt Kemp and his .850 OPS) for most of the early part of the season. He sent a good number of Dodger relievers to the DL through overwork. He essentially threw Game 3 of the NLCS by starting Kuroda, who hadn't pitched in over a month and had just recovered from a spine injury. Would the Dodgers have also lost if they used Billingsley? Probably, but it would've been much less-risky and embarrassing than using Kuroda.

With Managers regularly executing idiotic moves, how can they justify their salaries? Their jobs should be to manage the players and follow the strategies that allow for maximum success, not to cling to ideas that have been proven ineffective. I have trouble understanding the logic of paying an individual so much money to hurt their team's chance of winning a game.